New Developments in the Methodology of Expert- and Argument-Based Probabilistic Population Forecasting

All population projections are based in one form or another on expert judgement about likely future trends, structural continuity, etc. Although experts are clearly superior to lay people in their field of expertise, when it comes to forecasting they may make serious errors and can be as ignorant as anybody. In the context of expert-based probabilistic population projections, this issue is receiving even more attention. In this paper we argue that information about the future cannot be true for the reason that it is being presented by an acknowledged authority (institution or person), nor is it acceptable to resolve scientific issues on the ground of voting or concert. As an alternative we propose the concept of argument-based expert opinion. Under this approach any structural and trend assumption needs to be based on explicit argumentation rather than implicit judgement

Reflecting on the Physics of Notations applied to a visualisation case study

This paper presents a critical reflection upon the concept of 'physics of notations' proposed by Moody. This is based upon the post hoc application of the concept in the analysis of a visualisation tool developed for a common place mathematics tool. Although this is not the intended design and development approach presumed or preferred by the physics of notations, there are benefits to analysing an extant visualisation. In particular, our analysis benefits from the visualisation having been developed and refined employing graphic design professionals and extensive formative user feedback. Hence the rationale for specific visualisation features is to some extent traceable. This reflective analysis shines a light on features of both the visualisation and domain visualised, illustrating that it could have been analysed more thoroughly at design time. However the same analysis raises a variety of interesting questions about the viability of scoping practical visualisation design in the framework proposed by the physics of notations

The mechanism of the Einstellung (set) effect: A pervasive source of cognitive bias

Copyright @ The Authors 2010The eye movements of expert players trying to solve a chess problem show that the first idea that comes to mind directs attention towards sources of information consistent with itself and away from inconsistent information. This bias continues unconsciously even when the player believes he is looking for alternatives. The result is that alternatives to the first idea are ignored. This mechanism for biasing attention ensures a speedy response in familiar situations but it can lead to errors when the first thought that comes to mind is not appropriate. We propose that this mechanism is the source of many cognitive biases from phenomena in problem solving and reasoning, to perceptual errors and failures in memory

Visual search in ecological and non-ecological displays: Evidence for a non-monotonic effect of complexity on performance

Copyright @ 2013 PLoSThis article has been made available through the Brunel Open Access Publishing Fund.Considerable research has been carried out on visual search, with single or multiple targets. However, most studies have used artificial stimuli with low ecological validity. In addition, little is known about the effects of target complexity and expertise in visual search. Here, we investigate visual search in three conditions of complexity (detecting a king, detecting a check, and detecting a checkmate) with chess players of two levels of expertise (novices and club players). Results show that the influence of target complexity depends on level of structure of the visual display. Different functional relationships were found between artificial (random chess positions) and ecologically valid (game positions) stimuli: With artificial, but not with ecologically valid stimuli, a “pop out” effect was present when a target was visually more complex than distractors but could be captured by a memory chunk. This suggests that caution should be exercised when generalising from experiments using artificial stimuli with low ecological validity to real-life stimuli.This study is funded by Brunel University and the article is made available through the Brunel Open Access Publishing Fund

A pattern-recognition theory of search in expert problem solving

Understanding how look-ahead search and pattern recognition interact is one of the important research questions in the study of expert problem-solving. This paper examines the implications of the template theory (Gobet & Simon, 1996a), a recent theory of expert memory, on the theory of problem solving in chess. Templates are "chunks" (Chase & Simon, 1973) that have evolved into more complex data structures and that possess slots allowing values to be encoded rapidly. Templates may facilitate search in three ways: (a) by allowing information to be stored into LTM rapidly; (b) by allowing a search in the template space in addition to a search in the move space; and (c) by compensating loss in the "mind's eye" due to interference and decay. A computer model implementing the main ideas of the theory is presented, and simulations of its search behaviour are discussed. The template theory accounts for the slight skill difference in average depth of search found in chess players, as well as for other empirical data

Expert chess memory: Revisiting the chunking hypothesis

After reviewing the relevant theory on chess expertise, this paper re-examines experimentally the finding of Chase and Simon (1973a) that the differences in ability of chess players at different skill levels to copy and to recall positions are attributable to the experts' storage of thousands of chunks (patterned clusters of pieces) in long-term memory. Despite important differences in the experimental apparatus, the data of the present experiments regarding latencies and chess relations between successively placed pieces are highly correlated with those of Chase and Simon. We conclude that the 2-second inter-chunk interval used to define chunk boundaries is robust, and that chunks have psychological reality. We discuss the possible reasons why Masters in our new study used substantially larger chunks than the Master of the 1973 study, and extend the chunking theory to take account of the evidence for large retrieval structures (templates) in long-term memory